Cheat Proof Game Protocols

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Fairness protocol games 10:23 It's not about the monetary policy of 21 million bitcoin, or smart contract execution, or DApps, or blockchain improvements, it's about delivering fairness, at scale, without intermediaries 11:18 Enforcement is included, by design, in fairness protocols 11:48 We have a pattern, a system, that allows fair outcomes.
AbstractSynchronization protocols based on “dead-reckoning” are vulnerable to a popular type of cheat called speed-hack. A speed-hack helps a cheater to gain unfair advantages by essentially speeding up the actions of the avatar controlled by the cheater, so that the cheater can move, explore and gather items faster than honest players.
An,illustrating two-player Bayesian game is studied, and different,optimality criteria, including Pareto-Optimal and time-restricted,bargaining solution is performed to refine the obtained equilibriums.,And finally, a cheat-proof cooperation strategy is derived which,provide the users in wireless live streaming social network an secured.
Cheat-Proof Playout for Centralized and Peer-to-Peer Gaming Abstract: We explore exploits possible for cheating in real-time, multiplayer games for both client-server and serverless architectures. We offer the first formalization of cheating in online games and propose an initial set of strong solutions.

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Networked online games are increasingly becoming attractive to many players. Multiplayer role-playing games need to incorporate several techniques to prevent any foul play or cheating. The multiplayer nature and network latency are still challenging the level of security provided in real time games. In this paper we introduce the main concepts of real time game environments, and overview the classification of cheating in games. We analyse various game architectures and investigate time based cheats and available cheat proof protocols. A cheat proof protocol with no performance penalties is developed and analysed. The proposed ...
View more >Networked online games are increasingly becoming attractive to many players. Multiplayer role-playing games need to incorporate several techniques to prevent any foul play or cheating. The multiplayer nature and network latency are still challenging the level of security provided in real time games. In this paper we introduce the main concepts of real time game environments, and overview the classification of cheating in games. We analyse various game architectures and investigate time based cheats and available cheat proof protocols. A cheat proof protocol with no performance penalties is developed and analysed. The proposed technique relies on the supervision of a trusted supervising node.
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by Nathaniel E. Baughman and Brian Neil Levine
In Proceedings IEEE InfoCom, pages 104 - 113, 2001
Paper: (ps)CiteSeer

Presented by Georg Wittenburg onMarch 24, 2004 as part of538A (201): Topics in ComputerSystems.
Slides: (ppt)(pdf)

Background

The paper 'Cheat-Proof Playout for Centralized and Distributed Online Games'was written by Nathaniel E. Baughman and Brian Neil Levine and published in theProceedings of IEEE InfoCom in 2001. Nathaniel E. Baughman was presumablyworking as a post-graduate student with newly appointed Prof. Brian Neil Levineat the University of Massachusetts. It is unknown to the author what NathanielE. Baughman did after writing this paper; Brian Neil Levine has continued topublish papers, although not directly related to the one that is topic of thissummary.

Summary

The paper deals with attacks and other potential weaknesses of online games.The aim is to offer a formalization of these attacks, suggest counter-measures,and assess their implications on the performance of a game. Games are generallyclassified as falling into one of the following areas, depending on theunderlying architecture chosen to control gameplay and data storage:

The paper then goes on to discuss security relevant weaknesses in detail:

Suppress-Correct Cheat: In a dead reckoning environment,i.e. when basing real-time information on estimates rather than on actual data,which may be unavailable due to network problems, a player may intentionallydelay her actions as long as the dead reckoning can compensate for this. Duringthis delay however, an advantage may be gained by observing the timely actionsof other players and adjusting the reactions accordingly. No solution has beenproposed to this problem other than to avoid implementations based on deadreckoning that allow for packets to be delayed.
Lookahead Cheat: In turn based games (which includes mostreal-time games as the real-time simulation is approximated by very shortturns), a player may wait for all other players to submit their actions beforechoosing her own action, thereby gaining an unfair advantage. The proposedsolution to this is to exchange cryptographic hashes of the chosen actions, andonly sending the actions once the hashes of all other players have beenreceived. A cryptographic hash is the return value of function that has theoriginal data as input. It is not possible to find the original data based onthe hash value, except by brute force. The complete procedure to defend againstthe lookahead cheat is referred to as 'Lockstep Protocol.' It has performanceissues as it requires the players to synchronize all their actions. The authorspropose to avoid this by defining Spheres of Influence (SoI) of a player andonly using the lockstep protocol if the spheres of influence overlap, or mightoverlap during the next turn.
Verifying Secret Possessions: Occasionally, players need toverify that other players have reached their current state, e.g. the possessionof an artifact, by legal means in the past. On the other hand, this informationshould not be available to all players, as it is a strategic in the game. Inorder to solve this problem, the authors suggest that players send hashes ofcritical parts of their state to a trusted entity -- a 'Logger' -- whichtimestamps the information and releases it when required to do so by thegameplay.
Verifying Hidden Positions: Sometimes a piece ofinformation, e.g. the positions of players, needs to be compared withoutactually releasing that information. The authors offer a cryptologicalsolution to this problem based on the use of commutative cryptosystem and aseries of operations on the data that allows for the results to be compared andyielding the correct result, while keeping the initial data hidden.

Of the four attacks / weaknesses discussed, the main focus of the paper is onthe lockstep protocol. The paper contains a proof of correctness and aperformance analysis based on an implementation in an online multi-player game.The other points are handled with less emphasis.

The paper falls a bit short of its initial claim to propose a protocol thathas provable anti-cheating guarantees. The authors rather model online games,and list a set of possible weaknesses to some of which they also propose asolution. The structure of the paper is slightly confusing.

Discussion

Pipelining of the Lockstep Protocol: The lockstep protocolcould be further optimized by interleaving the interchange of hashes andcomplete actions. This idea is central to the next paper presented inclass.
Denial of Service on Spheres of Influence: Overlappingspheres of influence incur a performance penalty for all affected players. Thismight be exploited to perform denial of service attacks.
Generality of Spheres of Influence: The generalapplicability of the spheres of influence concept is not obvious. What a playercan influence depends highly on the game, and may be unrelated to physicalproximity in the simulation (think sniper rifle).